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INTRODUCTION 
I have been asked to try to provide a context for this symposium. The 
basic premise of the symposium is that lawyers historically have been 
among the principal guardians of legal institutions and the rule of law. A 
second premise is that current business, regulatory, and educational chal-
lenges threaten that historic role. I suggest the reality is not that simple. 
Lawyers play an important part in keeping the rule of law alive, but 
we do so largely in our own interest. As lawyers' monopoly over the deliv-
ery of legal services has eroded, lawyer incentives to care about legal insti-
tutions have diminished, and other parts of our society have shown little 
inclination to assume the public role traditionally maintained by lawyers. At 
* Oppenheim Professor of Antitrust & Trade Regulation Law, George Washington 
University Law School. Parts of this paper are based on the Author's book, THOMAS D. 
MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER (20 I 0). 
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the same time, some legal institutions are themselves changing and the pub-
lic seems relatively disinterested in their declining importance. 
I. LA WYERS AS GUARDIANS OF THE RULE OF LAW IS A RELATIVELY 
RECENT IDEA 
It is tempting to posit a world when all was well or at least much bet-
ter off than it is today; usually, however, the predecessor time did not really 
exist. Whatever name one gives the fact that many contemporary lawyers 
put financial success above the rule of law and legal institutions,1 the phe-
nomenon did not begin with lawyer marketing, the 9/11 attack, or the hous-
ing finance fiasco that led to the recession of2008. 
Part of the confusion on this issue arises from the lingering belief of 
many American lawyers that our own profession is derived from the British 
tradition of a Bar that engaged in a largely unsupervised process of admit-
ting, training, promoting, and disciplining its members.2 Under such a sys-
tem, lawyers have a powerful incentive to perpetuate institutions that will 
take care of them during their lifetimes and honor their memory when they 
are gone. That world of lawyer dominance of the legal system was never 
more than partly true in the United States, and it is rapidly changing in 
Great Britain.3 
Jerold Auerbach writes that large parts of America began as lawyer-
free zones "whose Edenic visions of New World possibilities consigned 
lawyers to a role only slightly above the Biblical serpent.'"' Professor Auer-
bach suggests that societies without lawyers succeeded because they were 
1. Professor David Barnhizer has written provocative papers on this subject. E.g., 
David Barnhizer, Children of a Lesser God: Lawyers, Economics, and the Systematic Cor-
ruption of the Legal Profession (Cleveland-Marshall Coli. of Law, Research Paper No. 09-
174, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=l375028 [here-
inafter Barnhizer, Children]; David Barnhizer, Go/em, "Collum", Gone: The Lost Honor of 
the Legal Profession (Cleveland-Marshall Coli. of Law, Research Paper No. 11-203, 2011), 
available at http:/ /papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1734412 [hereinafter Barn-
hizer, Go/em]. 
2. See, e.g., ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & CHARLES 0. PORTER, THE AMERICAN 
LAWYER: A SUMMARY OF THE SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 281-96 (1954); ROSCOE 
POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 130-38 (1953). 
3. POUND, supra note 2, at 130-38; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY 
OF AMERICAN LAW 34-36, 46-48 (1985); MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A 
CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876 34 (1976); KERMIT L. HALL & PETER KARSTEN, THE MAGIC 
MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 22-23 (2d ed. 2009); David Maxweii-Fyfe, The Inns of 
Court and the Impact on the Legal Profession in England, 4 Sw. L.J. 391 (1950). As dis-
cussed later, the British Legal Services Act of 2007, 2007 Chapter 29, has made major 
changes in the regulation of both barristers and solicitors. See Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29 
(Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007!29/contents; infra notes 68-72 
and accompanying text. 
4. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 8 (1983). 
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communities whose values were not adequately captured in civil law.5 
Quakers in Philadelphia, Jews in New York, Amish in Iowa, Chinese on the 
west coast, and Mormons in Utah all tried, for periods of time, to settle dis-
putes and regulate other relationships without civil law and lawyers.6 
Lawyers today take pride in the number of lawyers who led our new 
nation. Our fellow lawyers rose to positions of prominence when British 
Parliamentary Acts came for enforcement in colonial courts, and it was 
lawyers who were first called upon to articulate the "natural rights" princi-
ples under which the laws were unenforceable. 7 When the Revolution be-
gan, however, a large percentage of lawyers cast their lot with Great Brit-
ain;8 40% of Massachusetts lawyers were loyal to the mother country and at 
least 200 left the country because they were British loyalists.9 
As the new nation emerged from its revolutionary birth, its lawyers no 
longer limited themselves to recording deeds and handling modest claims. 
"The leaders of the Bar in the period after 1 790 are not the land conveyanc-
ers . . . of the earlier period, but for the first time, the commercial law-
yers."10 Lawyers developed a practice of resolving cases on questions oflaw 
and reducing judges' deference to jury decisions in commercial disputes. 11 
Overall, American lawyers would probably not have called themselves ad-
vocates for the rich, but they apparently did see themselves moderating 
what could otherwise be wide swings of mood and policy in a democracy .12 
5. !d. at 3-17. 
6. !d. at 19-68, 82-83. '"As for the Business of an Attorney,' wrote the evangelical 
preacher George Whitefield, 'I think it unlawful for a Christian, or at least exceeding danger-
ous: Avoid it therefore, and glorify God in some other Station."' !d. at 41 (quoting ALAN 
HEIMERT, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN MIND: FROM THE GREAT AWAKENING TO THE 
REVOLUTION 180 (1966)). "Brigham Young described lawyers as 'a stink in the nostrils of 
every Latter-Day Saint."' !d. at 55. Even now, some urge evangelical Christians to take a 
similar court-avoidance approach. See generally LYNN R. BuzzARD & LAURENCE EcK, TELL 
IT TO THE CHURCH (1982). 
7. Richard B. Morris, The Legal Profession in America on the Eve of the Revolu-
tion, in POLITICAL SEPARATION AND LEGAL CONTINUITY 3, 18-23 (Harry W. Jones ed., 1976). 
8. !d. at 23-27; see also BLOOMFIELD, supra note 3, at 139 (noting that one-fourth 
of prewar practitioners left the country). 
9. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 303-04. 
10. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 
140-41 (1977). 
11. !d. at 142-45, 150-55. Three procedural devices were developed to keep mer-
chant cases away from juries. !d. at 141. First was the '"special case"' that allowed submit-
ting points oflaw to the court alone. !d. at 142. Second was "the award of ... new trial[s] for 
verdicts" that were "'contrary to the weight of the evidence,"' thus giving courts the power to 
avoid jurors' mistakes. !d. Third was instructing juries rather than letting them decide both 
the facts and the law. !d. at 143. 
12. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1274-
75 (1991); see also Paul D. Carrington, A Tale ofTwoLawyers, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 615,615-
16 (1997). 
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It was in this sense of American lawyers as relatively-worldly figures 
in a backwoods society that Alexis de Tocqueville offered his description of 
lawyers as "a sort of privileged class among [persons of] intelligence."13 But 
what he said next is far less flattering to modern readers looking for defend-
ers of the rule of law: 
Hidden at the bottom of the souls oflawyers one therefore finds a part of the tastes 
and habits of aristocracy. They have its instinctive penchant for order, its natural 
love of forms; they conceive its great disgust for the actions of the multitude and 
secretly scorn the government of the people. 14 
Indeed, in the years after de Tocqueville's visit in the 1830s, the "peo-
ple" reciprocated some of the disgust he found to have been felt by lawyers. 
States eased barriers to becoming a lawyer, and educational standards be-
came low or nonexistent. 15 Roscoe Pound called the period from 1836 to 
1870 the "Era of Decadence" and attributed many of its problems to the 
decline of lawyers' status. 16 But Professor Lawrence Friedman describes the 
period in different terms: 
It was a society where many people, not just the noble or the lucky few, needed 
some rudiments of law, some forms or form-books, some know-how about the 
mysterious ways of courts or governments .... In many ways, then, loose standards 
were inevitable. Perhaps they even enhanced the vigor of the bar. Formal re-
strictions tended to disappear; but the market for legal services remained, a harsh 
and sometimes efficient control. It pruned away deadwood; it rewarded the adap-
tive and the cunning. Jacksonian democracy did not make every man a lawyer. It 
did encourage a scrambling bar of shrewd entrepreneurs. 17 
In response to this phenomenon, in 1870, "the 'decent part' of the pro-
fession" created the Association ofthe Bar of the City ofNew York. 18 Later 
that same decade, Simeon E. Baldwin led a call for a national bar associa-
tion, 19 and under his leadership, 100 leading lawyers from around the coun-
13. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 254 (Harvey C. Mansfield & 
Delba Winthrop trans., 2000) (alteration in original). 
14. !d. 
15. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 318. 
16. POUND, supra note 2, at 221-49. 
17. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 318. 
18. !d. at 648-50; see also Robert W. Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the 
Law": Fantasies and Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH 
PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51,51 (Gerald W. Gawalt ed., 1984). 
19. Baldwin, a Yale law professor, later became Chief Justice and then Governor of 
Connecticut. EDSON R. SUNDERLAND, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND ITS 
WoRK 3 (1953). Earlier, in 1849, a much broader group called the American Legal Associa-
tion had been established, and in 1850 its founder, John Livingston, published the names and 
addresses of all known practicing lawyers and judges in the United States, a total of 21,979. 
BLOOMFIELD, supra note 3, at 154-55; FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 633. The organization 
never really got traction, however, and it collapsed in 1854. See BLOOMFIELD, supra note 3, 
at 154-55. 
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try formed the American Bar Association (ABA) in 1878, in Saratoga, New 
York.20 
No matter how they tried to increase their sense of respectability, 
however, prominent lawyers could not get away from the fact they largely 
represented large corporations and their owners. These lawyers were sub-
jected to intense criticism for undercutting public faith in the rule of law. 
President Theodore Roosevelt told Harvard graduates in 1905: 
We all know that ... many of the most influential and most highly remunerated 
members of the Bar in every centre of wealth make it their special task to work out 
bold and ingenious schemes by which their very wealthy clients, individual or cor-
porate, can evade the laws which are made to regulate in the interest of the public 
the use of great wealth. Now, the great lawyer who employs his talent and learning 
in ... enabling a very wealthy client to override or circumvent the law is doing all 
that in him lies to encourage the growth in this country of a spirit of dumb anger 
against all laws and of disbelief in their efficacy.Z1 
The ABA adopted its first Canons of Ethics in 1908 in large part to de-
flect such charges/2 and in 1923, ABA President John W. Davis called for a 
federal union between the ABA and state bar associations so that the ABA 
could speak "with the accredited voice of the united bar of the entire coun-
try" and give all bar organizations "a broader sense of professional solidari-
ty and responsibility."23 But when we think of today's ABA, with over 
400,000 members and a national lobbying network, it is easy to forget that, 
after President Davis's call, it took until 1936 for the ABA to become the 
broad national organization that we now know.24 
In 1936, the Depression was near its deepest and the Roosevelt admin-
istration had backed "Codes of Fair Competition," prepared by tripartite 
institutions of labor, management, and government, but that otherwise had a 
controversial legal basis. Just two years earlier, Supreme Court Justice Har-
lan Fiske Stone had warned: 
20. SUNDERLAND, supra note 19, at 3-4; see also John A. Matzko, "The Best Men of 
the Bar": The Founding of the American Bar Association, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: 
LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA, supra note 18, at 75. 
21. James M. Altman, Considering the A.B.A.'s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2395, 2404 (2003) (quoting The Harvard Spirit, HARV. GRADUATES' 
MAG., Sept. 1905, at 7-8). 
22. In 1908, the ABA adopted its Canons of Ethics. 0RIE L. PHILLIPS & PHILBRICK. 
MCCOY, CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS: A STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS DISCIPLINE 
AND DISBARMENT 12 (1952). A committee to amend it was appointed in 1923, and the 
amendments were approved in 1928. See id. Canons of Judicial Ethics were adopted in 1924. 
!d. All but four states adopted the ABA Code or something close to it, although by 1950, in 
only eighteen of the states was the Code adopted by the state Supreme Court. Id. at 15. 
23. SUNDERLAND,supranote l9,at91, 173. 
24. See id. at 173. In 1936, the ABA had 28,228 members, of whom about 10% 
came to the annual meeting. !d. at 221. By 1950, ABA membership had increased to 42,121, 
of whom 3,233 came to the annual meeting. Id. 
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We meet at a time when, as never before in the history of the country, our most 
cherished ideals and traditions are being subjected to searching criticism .... [W]e 
may rightly look to the Bar for leadership in the preservation and development of 
American institutions. Specially trained in the field of law and government, invest-
ed with the unique privileges of his office, experienced in the world of affairs, and 
versed in the problems of business organization and administration, to whom, if not 
to the lawyer, may we look for guidance in solving the problems of a sorely strick-
en social order?25 
Giving authority to a new House of Delegates that included state bar 
associations and other potentially-influential professional groups gave the 
ABA hope that it could help marshal public influence behind common posi-
tions.26 Among the first things the transformed ABA aggressively-and 
successfully-opposed was President Roosevelt's court packing p1an.27 
Later, prominent lawyers such as Reginald Heber Smith, the father of 
Legal Aid, were concerned that if lawyers did not assume greater responsi-
bilities to see that law met the needs of ordinary citizens, the government 
would "socialize" the profession and do it for them: 
For selfish and unselfish reasons we hope that the new world will be attracted by 
our form of government and the American way of life so that, in other nations, free 
peoples will set up democratic regimes and institutions .... Law is the foundation 
of our whole structure. We are determined that it shall be strong. We know that law 
is not self-enforcing, and that lawyers are essential.28 
It was in that context that lawyers called for a renewal of the vision of 
lawyers as the principal custodians of American law and the American way 
of life. 29 Those of us who came to the bar in the 1960s tend to think lawyers 
were calling for civil rights and civil liberties, but one of recent history's 
great ironies is that leaders of the ABA up to the early 1950s were generally 
25. Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. I, 1-2 
(1934). 
26. See SUNDERLAND, supra note 19, at 173-76. Among the other groups represent-
ed in the House of Delegates were the American Law Institute and the American Judicature 
Society. /d. at 177-78. The meeting at which these changes were adopted is reported in detail 
in 22 A.B.A. J. 661 (1936). 
27. See, e.g., Frederick H. Stinchfield, The Supreme Court Issue, 23 A.B.A. J. 233, 
233 ( 1937); Sylvester C. Smith, Jr., The Present Situation in the Fight to Save the Court, 23 
A.B.A. J. 401,401 (1937). The same volume of the ABA Journal contains a discussion by a 
member of the House of Delegates about the need to increase lawyer income by reducing the 
number of new lawyers. John Kirkland Clark, Limitation of Admission to the Bar, 23 A.B.A. 
J. 48, 48 (1937). For an account of other causes in which the ABA got involved, see Rayman 
L. Solomon, Five Crises or One: The Concept of Legal Professionalism, 1925-1960, in 
LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
PROFESSION 144, 168-73 (Robert L. Nelson, David M. Trubek & Rayman L. Solomon eds., 
1992). 
28. Reginald Heber Smith, Legal Service Offices for Persons of Moderate Means, 
1949 WIS. L. REV. 416, 444. 
29. See, e.g., POUND, supra note 2, at 20, 353. 
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highly conservative. They sought far reaching power for common-law 
courts just as the Supreme Court moved the law in ways then-leaders of the 
bar did not imagine possible. 30 
There is, of course, much more one could say about the ambiguous in-
terplay between lawyers, legal institutions, and the rule of law over time. 
But I think that in all of it what we are largely seeing is that law is a deriva-
tive profession. What lawyers do is-and mostly always has been-derived 
from what their clients do and want to do. Our professional challenge has 
been to help clients muddle through whatever confusing reality they face. 
II. CHANGES IN THE WORLD HAVE IMPACTED LA WYERS' ABILITY TO PLAY 
THE GUARDIAN ROLE 
To be sure, there was a time when lawyers asserted a greater role as 
guardians of legal institutions and the rule of law than they seem to do to-
day. I suspect that was because it was a time when lawyers believed they 
had control of the institutions in and through which they worked. As recent-
ly as the 1960s, lawyers largely organized how law was practiced, played an 
important part in bar admission, and played a significant role in policing 
ethical violations. That seeming control over the system in which they 
worked gave lawyers a professional identity and a stake in maintaining sys-
tems that they and their clients could perceive as fair and reliable. 
There are a number of ways to characterize what has changed over the 
last half-century, but I will concentrate on five changes in the world that 
lawyers face. These changes-far more than increased lawyer selfishness 
and decreased lawyer morality-are what I believe have led to the seeming-
ly declining sense of lawyer responsibility for legal institutions and the rule 
oflaw. 
A. Courts Have Eliminated Self-regulation and Made Lawyers Another 
Group ofEconomic Actors 
Throughout much of the 1950s and 1960s, lawyers could convince 
themselves they were part of a self-regulating profession. Unauthorized 
practice prohibitions--often enforced by criminal sanctions--defined work 
that only lawyers could do. Within that zone of protected activity, rules of 
30. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN 
MODERN AMERJCA 231-59 (1976). In 1954-the year after Dean Pound's volume-the Su-
preme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), rejecting the school 
district defense presented by John W. Davis, the earlier proponent of a larger, more assertive 
legal profession. !d. at 484, 495. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), with its one-person, 
one-vote mandate marked the next revolution, followed soon by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963), on the right to counsel, and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), on 
the right to a lawyer during police questioning. 
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professional conduct had been established by bar associations working 
through state supreme courts whose justices had been lawyers only a few 
years before.31 Insulation from outside influence on lawyer conduct was 
never complete, but it seemed nearly so until the United States Supreme 
Court began systematically to break down the special protections lawyers 
enjoyed. In NAACP v. Button,32 for example, the state of Virginia had ex-
tended the traditional ban against lawyer solicitation of new clients beyond 
the usual prohibition against hiring ambulance drivers to pass out a lawyer's 
cards. 33 The state had prohibited contact of potential clients by agents of any 
person or association that "'employs, retains or compensates any attorney'" 
in a "'judicial proceeding in which"' the person or organization "'is not a 
party and in which it has no pecuniary right or liability. "'34 As applied to the 
NAACP, the provision would have prohibited lawyers from cooperating 
with efforts to organize citizens to challenge racial segregation in the public 
schools.35 The state asserted that lawyers' attempts to obtain legal work are 
not speech protected by the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court said 
that, in this context, lawyers' ethical standards enjoyed no immunity from 
constitutional review.36 
Even more significant in exposing the legal profession to regulation 
like that under which almost everyone else works was the Court's 1975 
decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.31 When Lewis Goldfarb tried to 
buy a house in Fairfax County, Virginia, he discovered that all the lawyers 
he consulted proposed to charge him exactly the same fee. 38 The legal issue 
became the validity of the minimum fee schedule recommended by the Fair-
fax County Bar Association, a voluntary bar, but one recognized by the Vir-
ginia State Bar, the group with disciplinary authority over the state's law-
yers.39 Compliance with the fee schedule was not mandatory, but the State 
Bar had opined that a lawyer's "'habitual[]"' failure to comply with a local 
3 I. The most comprehensive discussion and critique of unauthorized practice provi-
sions is Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Em-
pirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. I (1981). 
32. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
33. /d. at 423-26. 
34. /d. at424 n.7 (quoting VA. CODE ANN.§ 54-78 (1958)). 
35. Perhaps the Court found it relevant that the Virginia statute had been passed in 
1956, just two years after Brown v. Board of Education had created the legal rights that the 
NAACP sought to enforce. !d. at 417-18. But the Court expressly said that it would have 
reached the same result if the older ABA Canons of Ethics had been the source of the prohi-
bition. /d. at 429 n.ll. 
36. !d. at 438-39. 
37. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
38. /d. at 776. 
39. /d. at 775. 
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fee schedule would '"raise[] a presumption'" that the lawyer was improper-
ly soliciting cases.40 
In an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, a unanimous Supreme Court 
found that the "voluntary" fee schedule had the practical effect of fixing 
prices for legal services in Fairfax County.41 More significantly for lawyers 
who thought themselves sheltered from outside regulation, the Court ex-
pressly rejected a contention that, as a "learned profession," the practice of 
law is not subject to antitrust constraints: 
The nature of an occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the 
Sherman Act, ... nor is the public-service aspect of professional practice control-
ling in determining whether § 1 includes professions .... Whatever else it may be, 
the examination of a land title is a service; the exchange of such a service for mon-
ey is "commerce" in the most common usage of that word. It is no disparagement 
of the practice of law as a profession to acknowledge that it has this business as-
pect.42 
The combination of First Amendment and Sherman Act attacks made 
it inevitable that the idea that, as a profession, lawyers were self-regulating 
and thus needed to look only inward was gone for good. The coup de grace 
was inflicted two years later in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.43 As in Button, 
the case involved the prohibition of solicitation.44 This time, John Bates and 
Van O'Steen had opened a "'legal clinic"' in Phoenix and had published a 
newspaper advertisement describing routine services they would perform 
such as uncontested divorces, adoptions, name changes, and simple personal 
bankruptcies for relatively low fees. 45 The Court's response to arguments 
that professionalism required prohibition of such advertising was withering: 
We recognize, of course, and commend the spirit of public service with which the 
profession of law is practiced and to which it is dedicated .... But we find the pos-
40. /d. at 777-78 (quoting Va. State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Formal Op. 98 
(1960)). 
41. Justice Powell, long a member of the Virginia State Bar, did not participate in 
the decision. /d. at 793. 
42. /d. at 787-88 (citations omitted). The Court closed: "In holding that certain 
anticompetitive conduct by lawyers is within the reach of the Sherman Act we intend no 
diminution of the authority of the State to regulate its professions." /d. at 793. However, that 
qualification has not reduced the significance of the decision. Just three years later, when an 
engineering association tried to rely on this language to justify its ethical restrain on competi-
tive bidding, the Court quickly brushed aside the special character of professions. See Nat'l 
Soc'y of Prof' I Eng'rs v. United States, 453 U.S. 679, 686-88 (1978); see also Arizona v. 
Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 332-33 (1982) (addressing a fee schedule for 
particular doctor services). 
43. 433 u.s. 350 (1977). 
44. /d. at 353. 
45. /d. at 354. Earlier, in 1972, Leonard Jacoby and Stephen Meyers had opened 
their own "legal clinic" in California, but the Arizona courts acted more quickly than those in 
California so the Bates case reached the Supreme Court first. In re Review of Op. 475 of 
Advisory Comm. on Prof'! Ethics, 444 A.2d 1092, 1094-95 (N.J. 1982). 
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tulated connection between advertising and the erosion of true professionalism to 
be severely strained. At its core, the argument presumes that attorneys must con-
ceal from themselves and from their clients the real-life fact that lawyers earn their 
livelihood at the bar. We suspect that few attorneys engage in such self-deception .. 
. . In fact, it has been suggested that the failure of lawyers to advertise creates pub-
lic disillusionment with the profession. The absence of advertising may be seen to 
reflect the profession's failure to reach out and serve the community.46 
In 1985, the American Law Institute-acknowledging that legal ethics 
is more about law than ethics-began to prepare the Restatement of the Law 
Governing Lawyers.47 At the same time, civil regulation of lawyers dramati-
cally increased as malpractice suits became more common.48 An important 
source of the move toward malpractice remedies was the failure of savings 
and loan associations in the 1980s, often after the mistaken advice of their 
lawyers that their loan practices were not in violation of federal regula-
tions.49 As a result of such cases, violation of ethical standards hit lawyers in 
the pocketbook, and malpractice insurance companies became some of the 
most important reviewers and regulators of lawyer conduct. In 2002-2003, 
the ABA again modified the Model Rules, this time in part to conform them 
to the statements of governing principles found in the Restatement.50 By 
then it was clear that the legal profession no longer exists in a protective 
bubble, and its regulation is no longer the business of lawyers alone. 51 
46. Bates, 433 U.S. at 368-70 (footnote omitted). "[F]alse, deceptive, or misleading" 
advertising may be regulated, and "limited" disclaimers may be required as to lawyers' 
claims about themselves. !d. at 383. However, "truthful advertisement concerning the availa-
bility and terms of routine legal services" is protected by the First Amendment. !d. at 384. 
Other cases have upheld First Amendment protection of most lawyer advertising. E.g., In re 
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court 
of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Peel v. Attor-
ney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990). But see Fla. Bar v. Went For 
It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (upholding prohibition of targeted direct mail within thirty days 
of an accident or disaster). In Bates, Bates and O'Steen had also challenged advertising re-
strictions under the Sherman Act. Bates, 433 U.S. at 359. However, the Arizona Supreme 
Court had specifically imposed the bar to lawyer advertising in a court rule. /d. Thus, under 
the rule of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), federal antitrust law had to give way to the 
state regulation. Bates, 433 U.S. at 359. 
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD): THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS xxi-xxiv (2000). 
48. See I RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE§§ 1.6-1. 7 
(2005). 
49. See, e.g., In reAm. Cont'l Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 
1424 (D. Ariz. 1992). 
50. See THOMAS D. MORGAN, LAWYER LAW: COMPARING THE ABA MODEL RULES 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WITH THE ALI RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS xiii (2005). 
51. Additional Supreme Court cases overturning lawyer self-regulation include In re 
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 723-27 (1973) (requiring bar applicants to be U.S. citizens denies 
equal protection); Supreme Court of NH. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 288 (1985) (requiring bar 
applicants to reside in state violates the privileges and immunities clause); and Supreme 
Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 61 (1988) (allowing only state residents to be admit-
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B. The Growth in the Number of Lawyers Has Diluted Many Lawyers' 
Sense of Common Purpose 
It was not until 1963-1964 that law school enrollments equaled those 
immediately after World War II, but they have been growing ever since.52 
Over the last forty years, the American bar has grown more rapidly and 
changed more profoundly than in any comparable-length period in history.53 
Academic year 1972-1973 was the year of the most dramatic growth in the 
number of U.S. law students.54 The number of students enrolled in law 
school in that year was approximately 30% of the total number of U.S. law-
yers in the same year. 55 As a result, the total number of U.S. lawyers went 
on to double during the decade of the 1970s. 56 
Growth in applications was in part from returning Vietnam War veter-
ans, but the largest source of the increase could be attributed to a new inter-
est in law school among women and members of minority groups-both of 
which had previously been greatly under-represented among lawyers.57 
Since the 1970s, student interest in becoming lawyers has remained strong, 
and one effect has been a quadrupling of the size of the legal profession 
from about 300,000 in 1970 to close to 1,200,000 lawyers today.58 
ted "on motion," for example, without taking a bar exam, also violates the privileges and 
immunities clause). 
52. N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N COMM. ON THE LAW GOVERNING FIRM STRUCTURE, 
PRESERVING THE CORE VALUES OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 7 (2000), available at 
http://www .law .cornell. edu/ethics/mdp.htm. 
53. See John C. York & Rosemary D. Hale, Too Many Lawyers? The Legal Services 
Industry: Its Structure and Outlook, 26 J. LEGAL Eouc. I, 5 (1973). 
54. See id. 
55. /d. at I n.3. In round numbers, there were just over 300,000 lawyers and I 00,000 
students were in law school. !d. Indeed, the authors were so alarmed by the growth that they 
predicted that "up to half of the graduates in the near future may have to seek employment in 
fields where traditionally legal training is not a prerequisite." ld. at 31. 
56. The most carefully collected data on the legal profession remains BARBARA A. 
CURRAN ET AL., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE U.S. 
LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1980s (1985) and BARBARA A. CURRAN & CLARA N. CARSON, THE 
LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1990s (1994). 
57. See Richard L. Abel, The Transformation of the American Legal Profession, 20 
LAW & Soc'y REV. 7, 7 (1986); Barbara A. Curran, American Lawyers in the 1980s: A Pro-
fession in Transition, 20 LAW & Soc'y REV. 19, 19, 25 (1986). For reasons no one seems to 
have been able to explain fully, the number of white males in law school each year has re-
mained almost constant since 1973. See Curran, supra, at 19. 
58. For a critique oflaw schools' role in this development, see, for example, Bam-
hizer, Children, supra note I, at 31-36. A chronic problem in determining the number of 
lawyers is the lack of data on lawyer deaths and retirements and the fact that many people 
with law degrees are not practicing law. 
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As a result, one inescapable reality facing today's lawyers is the great-
ly increased number of fellow lawyers chasing the same work. 59 The de-
mand for lawyers has also increased, although not proportionately. Univer-
sity of Chicago economist Peter Pashigian has convincingly shown that the 
most important stimulus for the need for legal services is not the growth in 
population or the degree of regulation, not the receptivity of courts to new 
legal theories, indeed not anything internal to the legal system; instead, de-
mand for legal services correlates most closely with growth in gross domes-
tic product (GDP), the level of economic activity in the country generally.60 
The nation's GDP in constant dollars has grown at about the same rate 
as the number of lawyers in times of prosperity.61 Lawyers did well during 
the economic bubble that drove GDP growth to 4% in many years. But the 
effect of recessions in the late 1970s, early 1990s, early 2000s, and now 
again since 2008-while production of lawyers remained high-has pro-
duced a "surplus" of lawyers that understandably makes the pressure to at-
tract clients feel more intense today than it did forty years ago.62 
Growth in numbers of lawyers this extensive and this rapid has had an 
inevitable effect of reducing the level of informal sanctions that character-
ized earlier efforts to enforce appropriate-what used to be called "profes-
sional"-conduct. I would say that one is more likely to treat a fellow law-
yer well when one expects to meet that lawyer again. But the informal pen-
alties for behaving badly go down when the numbers of lawyers makes it 
less likely a pay-back time will ever come. The current legal environment 
tends not to reward building of the rule of law and legal institutions and not 
to penalize individual lawyers who fail to do so. 
C. The Impact of Globalization on Lawyers and the Practice ofLaw 
As the world's supply of lawyers grows, the world is getting smaller 
and more interdependent. It is not the presence of international exports and 
imports that is new; global merchants have been at work throughout history. 
59. See generally CURRAN & CARSON, supra note 56. Unfortunately, the American 
Bar Foundation has not continued to produce comparable data on the number and distribu-
tion of lawyers. 
60. See generally B. Peter Pashigian, The Market for Lawyers: The Determinants of 
the Demand for and Supply of Lawyers, 20 J.L. & EcoN. 53 (1977); B. Peter Pashigian, The 
Number and Earnings of Lawyers: Some Recent Findings, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 51; B. 
Peter Pashigian, Regulation, Preventive Law, and the Duties of Attorneys, in THE CHANGING 
ROLE OF THE CORPORATE ATTORNEY 3 (William J. Carney ed., 1982). 
61. See generally Thomas D. Morgan, Economic Reality Facing 21st Century Law-
yers, 69 WASH. L. REV. 625 (1994). 
62. Indeed, my work in the mid-1990s to update the Pashigian numbers indicated 
that by even then, growth in the supply of lawyers was at least 15% greater than the growth 
in demand. See id. at 628-30. 
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What "globalization" describes is the recent unprecedented reduction of 
tariffs, growth in the volume of international commerce, and heightened 
competitive pressure that imported products and exported work impose on 
lawyers and their clients.63 
Not everyone views the trend toward globalization as benign. Concern 
is high that competitive pressure to attract business may cause states and 
nations to lure their people into dead-end jobs and even undercut the ability 
of democratic governments to promote social justice. And the volatile capi-
tal markets experienced around the world in late-2008 have tended to con-
firm that bad credit practices in advanced countries can upset the lives of 
people all over the rest of the world.64 Economists argue that intense compe-
tition among producers will ultimately benefit consumers everywhere. In 
the meantime, however, lawyers' clients experience global competition in 
the form of an often excruciating need to control costs. Some call this the 
"Wal-Mart effect" because it is seen so clearly in the pressure that retailers 
put on suppliers to lower their prices by wringing every last fraction of a 
cent out of costs.65 
Even lawyers who were trained in local law and licensed by state 
courts will not be able to ignore the effects of globalization on their own 
activities. First, globalization will require lawyers to understand the legal 
principles that allow clients' international commerce to proceed. Indeed, a 
client engaged in e-commerce may do virtual business everywhere in the 
world simultaneously, and a lawyer who continues to focus only on what 
used to be important will neither serve her clients well nor retain her clients 
long. The day has come and gone when national borders-and, a fortiori, 
state borders-likely have any real significance in deciding how a transac-
tion should be structured or a matter litigated. 
Further, companies involved in global commerce hire or send employ-
ees all over the world. Those employees will create family relationship, 
taxation, and other financial issues that were largely unknown to previous 
lawyer generations. No lawyer can be an expert in all law everywhere, but 
63. See, e.g., THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2005). 
64. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 85 (2002) 
("Lower wages might lead some firms to hire a few more workers; but the number of newly 
hired workers may be relatively few, and the misery caused by the lower wages on all the 
other workers might be very grave."); see also GEORGE SOROS, GEORGE SOROS ON 
GLOBALIZATION 4-6 (2002). See generally DAVID M. SMICK, THE WORLD IS CURVED: HIDDEN 
DANGERS TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2008). 
65. See generally CHARLES FISHMAN, THE WAL-MART EFFECT: HOW THE WORLD'S 
MOST POWERFUL COMPANY WoRKs--AND HOW IT'S TRANSFORMING THE AMERICAN 
ECONOMY (2006). Wal-Mart has now hired pharmacists to run what at one time were inde-
pendent professional pharmacies. Jd. at 41-44. Who is to say they might not try to have law-
yers set up an office in a Wal-Mart store? 
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even the drafter of a will today must assume that some of the beneficiaries 
or some of the property could be in other states or nations. 
Finally, American lawyers' professional standards are likely to be af-
fected by globalization as the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) tends to break down barriers that today limit lawyers to practice in 
their home countries.66 GATS is not yet an accomplished fact, but the clear 
intention seems to be that French lawyers will be permitted to open a prac-
tice in the United States just as the European Union permits French lawyers 
to practice in Germany. When that happens, of course, it seems inevitable 
that a state such as California will have to also allow New York lawyers to 
open a practice in San Francisco.67 
That development, in tum, is magnified by changes occurring in law-
yer regulation in other parts of the world. English lawyers, for example, 
have recently experienced the most radical change in the regulation of their 
profession in their history. As a result of the Legal Services Act of 2007,68 
the number of activities that only a lawyer may do have been reduced,69 a 
law firm may have nonlawyer investors/0 and the lawyer-client privilege 
extends to communications with people who are not lawyers.71 If American 
lawyers ignore the fact that their direct competitors play by different rules, 
they will have only themselves to blame when clients seek the same or bet-
ter services at lower costs elsewhere.72 
66. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, WORLD TRADE ORO., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop _ e/serv _ e/gatsintr _ e.htm (last visited May 25, 20 12). 
67. For additional information, see generally LaurelS. Terry, GATS' Applicability to 
Transnational Lawyering and its Potential Impact on US. State Regulation of Lawyers, 34 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 989 (2001) and LaurelS. Terry, But What Will the WTO Disci-
plines Apply To?: Distinguishing Among Market Access, National Treatment and Article 
V/:4 Measures When Applying the GATS to Legal Services, 2003 PROF. LAW. 83 (2003). See 
also Carole Silver, Winners and Losers in the Globalization of Legal Services: Situating the 
Market for Foreign Lawyers, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 897,899-907 (2005) (discussing the increase 
in programs at U.S. law schools for foreign lawyers, many of whom hope to practice with 
U.S. firms). 
68. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29 (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.gov 
. uk/ukpga/2007 /29/contents. 
69. Id. § 12. 
70. Id. sched. 13. 
71. Id. § 190. 
72. See, e.g., John Flood, The Consequences of Clementi: The Global Repercussions 
for the Legal Profession After the Legal Services Act of 2007, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 537, 
549. It would be a mistake, of course, to assume that globalization will occur equally rapidly 
in every line of commerce. High-touch personal services are likely to be delivered locally. 
Part of the challenge in considering the impact of globalization on lawyers, then, will lie in 
distinguishing which lawyer roles are more like the making of machine parts and which 
require a local touch. 
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D. The Transformation of Lawyers' Work by Modem Information 
Technology 
Another factor contributing to globalization-and accelerated by it-
has been the revolution in computer storage and communications technolo-
gy that has occurred over roughly the same period as the rest of the revolu-
tion involving lawyers. The transformation of information technology has 
led to a variety of effects. 
First, in less than a decade, lawyers have gone from marketing their 
services locally through newspaper ads and Yellow Pages to global market-
ing on the world wide web. Some have chosen clever web addresses such as 
"lawyersforless.com," "thegunslinger.com," and "voiceoftheinjured.com."73 
Others have created the web-equivalent of attractive brochures with color 
pictures of the firm's lawyers and dramatic pictures of them in action. 
Second, lawyers-and nonlawyers-now have a capacity for legal re-
search that is quick and current. There is no easy excuse for overlooking a 
new statute or recent case. Many lawyers still prefer to read law out of 
books, but almost no lawyers can afford to stock books about the law across 
the nation and around the world. Now, technological advances have put the 
world's largest library on every lawyer's desk top, albeit at a high price. 
Reverence for the research methods of the past will not change the direction 
of this new reality. 
Third, technology makes it possible for lawyers and clients to have 
ready access to each other and each other's files, either with respect to a 
particular matter or more generally. Today, technology allows virtually as 
easy communication with a law firm across the country--or around the 
world-as with lawyers down the hall.74 A law firm and its client can use an 
intranet, for example, to share access to all the files on a given client matter. 
Or, a law firm can prepare compliance checklists, send them to clients for 
completion, and offer advice about places where the client appears not to be 
in compliance. Significant questions about proper billing for-and potential 
lawyer liability for-information and advice provided through such tech-
nology will remain, 75 but if the advantages of dealing in this way are real, 
one can expect firms will compete to deliver those advantages. 
73. LAWYERS FOR LESS, http://lawyersforless.com (last visited May 25, 2012); LAW 
OFFICES OF STEVEN R. YOUNG, http://www.thegunslinger.com (last visited May 25, 2012); 
PERENICH CAULFIELD AVRIL NOYES, http://www.voiceoftheinjured.com (last visited May 25, 
2012). 
74. The technologies are widely advertised in lawyer publications, and even dis-
counted for puffing, the implications are enormous. See, e.g., Neil Cameron, Client Portals: 
20 Years Late but Moving Fast, AM. LAW., July 2001 (advertising insert). 
75. See generally Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Ethical Risks from the Use of Tech-
nology, 31 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 (2004); Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client 
Relationships in Cyberspace: The Peril and the Promise, 49 DUKE L.J. 147 (1999); Natacha 
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Fourth, the increasing importance of information technology to law 
practice promises to transform tasks that used to be seen as complex, 
unique, and worthy of substantial fees into simple, repetitive operations 
provided to clients by the lowest bidder. Technology available on the sim-
plest personal computer can instantly allow a lawyer to tailor a 500-page 
document used in one transaction--change the names and terms-and use it 
in another deal. Obviously, the result will be a disaster if the document is 
not equally relevant to the new situation, so the malpractice risk created by 
the ease of copying can be substantial. Knowing what changes are needed to 
fit a new situation will always be a big part of the professional's service, but 
the benefits of standardizing forms in transactions promises to be enor-
mous. 76 Another result of document standardization, of course, will become 
the open secret that what lawyers do is no longer always a complex task 
requiring expertise worthy of premium pay. Much of what lawyers do is 
what most merchants do, that is to say, sell commodities that ultimately 
command only a price set in competition with many potential sellers.77 
Fifth, another technology-based reality that will transform lawyers' 
practice is the world of free information that lawyers have traditionally sold 
but is now available on the Internet. Books about law have been around for 
years, but technology now makes the information ubiquitous. It may be pro-
vided for no cost at websites ranging from Wikipedia to specialized blogs, 
and the effect is to render a great deal of formerly exotic legal information 
broadly accessible.78 Prepared by thousands of authors, these alternative 
information sources threaten the monopoly on which lawyers have depend-
ed for a steady client base.79 Clearly, lawyers will tend to be able to assimi-
late and apply information from these sources more quickly and accurately 
D. Steimer, Note, Cyberlaw: Legal Malpractice in the Age of Online Lawyers, 63 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 332 (1995). One form of liability sometimes overlooked may be copyright 
infringement. See, e.g., Davida H. Isaacs, The Highest Form of Flattery? Application of the 
Fair Use Defense Against Copyright Claims for Unauthorized Appropriation of Litigation 
Documents, 71 Mo. L. REV. 391 (2006). 
76. See generally Robert B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of Boilerplate, I 04 MICH. L. REV. 
1033 (2006) (discussing the rationale behind widespread use of boilerplate clauses). 
77. The key books in this area are RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF LAW: FACING 
THE CHALLENGES OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (1996) [hereinafter SUSSKIND, FUTURE] and 
RICHARD SUSSKIND, TRANSFORMING THE LAW: ESSAYS ON TECHNOLOGY, JUSTICE AND THE 
LEGAL MARKETPLACE (2000) [hereinafter SUSSKIND, TRANSFORMING]. 
78. For more about this phenomenon, see generally ORI BRAFMAN & Roo A. 
BECKSTROM, THE STARFISH AND THE SPIDER: THE UNSTOPPABLE POWER OF LEADERLESS 
ORGANIZATIONS (2006). 
79. See, e.g., DON TAPSCOTT & ANTHONY D. WILLIAMS, WIKJNOMICS: HOW MASS 
COLLABORATION CHANGES EVERYTHING II (2006) ("[C]redentialed knowledge producers 
share the stage with 'amateur' creators who are disrupting every activity they touch."); CASS 
R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 156-60 (2006). 
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than clients can, but the breakthrough is that a lawyer's knowledge is no 
longer a black box that clients cannot penetrate. 
Information may be provided free in a form available to all or only to 
those who have directly or indirectly paid a fee for the access. So far, the 
free or open-source approach has been much more pervasive than most 
Americans might have imagined. Whether free or for a charge, however, 
ubiquitous help from information services increasingly will be available to 
individuals planning their own affairs, drafting their own documents, and 
even appearing pro se in litigation just as software helps millions of former 
accounting clients prepare their own tax retums.80 Up to now, lawyer re-
sponses to such developments have largely been self-defeating. In Texas, an 
unauthorized practice of law challenge was brought against the sale of the 
Quicken Family Lawyer CD-ROM for use by people trying to draft their 
own legal documents. 81 From the standpoint of lawyers, use of such tools 
might seem amateurish and risky, but to many potential clients, the cost 
saving seems sensible. Notwithstanding lawyers' views, the Texas legisla-
ture promptly took the side of client freedom and made clear that the sale or 
use of such computer software does not involve the unauthorized practice of 
law.82 Clients' desire to avoid lawyer services might bother lawyers, but that 
desire is a reality lawyers ignore at their peril. 
The rise of e-commerce has transformed many brick-and-mortar busi-
nesses, and lawyers are not immune from such a transformation. Lawyers 
have traditionally been sources of legal information. Pressure will be sub-
stantial to replace lawyers with people who can quickly help clients find 
what they need on the Internet, and, at most, review a filled-in form before 
it is filed. As the example illustrates, even where the need for lawyers is not 
replaced by free information, the character of legal services is likely to 
change. Rather than retaining a lawyer to take a matter from beginning to 
end, clients are likely to buy only parts of a traditional representation. Dis-
aggregating legal services in this way is often likely to be in the client's 
interest, and lawyers will have to respond accordingly. Clients ultimately 
will do what they conclude is in their interest; the opportunities created by 
the availability oftechnology will transform the clients' choices.83 
80. See TURBOT AX, http://www.turbotax.com (last visited May 25, 2012). 
81. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., No. 
Civ.A.3:97CV-2859H, 1999 WL 47235, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999), vacated, 179 F.3d 
956, 956 (5th Cir. 1999). 
82. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 81.101 (West 2005), as amended by H.B. 1507, 76th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999). 
83. Indeed, we may not be far from future development of"expert systems" that can 
begin to do even basic legal reasoning and analysis. SUSSKIND, FUTURE, supra note 77, at 
xvii. For as long as computers are restricted to dealing with language rather than abstracts 
concepts, human beings are likely to be better at discerning patterns in apparently. disparate 
information, but there seems little doubt that in areas of the law where words are regularly 
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E. Transformation of the Relative Power ofln-House and Outside Counsel 
But the growth of law firms and the major shift of law practice toward 
corporate work pale by comparison to the rising power of in-house counsel. 
Thirty years ago, and in many cases much more recently, lawyers in private 
firms saw their role to be providing legal services to lay officers or employ-
ees of corporate clients. Today, that is far less true. The people many of 
today's lawyers have to please are other lawyers-this time lawyers acting 
in the role of general counsel to corporations, government agencies, and 
other organizations. In short, private law firms advise-and market their 
services to--corporate lawyers who decide what outside services the corpo-
rate client requires and why.84 
For many years, employment by a single client-as in the case of a 
company general counsel-was considered ethically suspect.85 Having only 
one client was said to expose the lawyer to client pressure to act improperly 
because the lawyer could not afford to lose his or her only job.86 Now, how-
ever, close to 25% of all lawyers act as employed counsel in government or 
other single client situations. 87 Of those, 40o/o-Or I 0% of all lawyers-act 
as inside corporate counsel.88 It is the in-house lawyers-not the partners in 
large law firms-who primarily counsel corporate management.89 It is they 
who hire outside counsel and who sometimes pressure outside counsel to 
conform to management's demands.90 Robert Nelson, for example, found: 
used in patterns, expert systems may indeed be possible. See id.; SussKIND, TRANSFORMING, 
supra note 77, at 161-220. Susskind sees three kinds of services in the future-traditional or 
high value that require personal work by lawyers, commoditized work where computers can 
aid immeasurably, and the "latent legal market," for example, people who up to now have 
not used legal services at all. SuSSKIND, FUTURE, supra note 77, at xlv-li. 
84. Carl Liggio, former general counsel of Arthur Young & Co., says that the "gold-
en years" for in-house corporate counsel were the 1920s and 1930s. See Carl D. Liggio, The 
Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1201, 1201 (1997); see also EvE 
SPANGLER, LAWYERS FOR HIRE: SALARIED PROFESSIONALS AT WORK 70-106 (1986); Robert 
Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and Organizational Repre-
sentation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 481-90 (1989) (calling this the "age of enlightenment" for in-
house counsel). 
85. See William L. Hanaway, Corporate Law Departments-A New Look, 17 Bus. 
LAW. 595,595-99 (1962). 
86. See id. at 597-99. 
87. THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 113 (2010). 
88. Susan Hackett, Inside Out: An Examination of Demographic Trends in the In-
House Profession, 44 ARIZ. L. REv. 609, 610-11 (2002). 
89. /d.at 612 (noting that over 61% of in-house general counsel who responded to a 
survey said that they report to the CEO of their organization, while another 15% report to the 
president); see also MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LA WYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN 
THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 34-36 (1994). 
90. See Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law 
Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 277, 289-93 (1985); Sarah Helene Duggin, The Pivotal Role of the 
General Counsel in Promoting Corporate Integrity and Professional Responsibility, 51 ST. 
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Even if law firm counsel were inclined to act as the conscience of their clients, 
their opportunity to do so has diminished as a result of the rise of internal counsel 
inside the corporation and the changing nature of relationships with corporate cli-
ents .... [T]hrough the process of advocating the interests of clients, large-firm at-
torneys come to strongly identify with them. It is highly unlikely, therefore, that 
lawyers in large law firms will act as an independent voice that checks the self-
interest of clients.91 
273 
Recruiting in-house lawyers rather than depending exclusively on out-
side firms began as a way to permit clients to avoid high, law firm billing 
rates and as a form of vertical integration that reduced the cost of searching 
for lawyers to do recurring tasks.92 It also was a response to expanding gov-
ernment regulation and the consequent burden of continuing compliance 
and litigation.93 But a strong, internal lawyer staff also helps assure that le-
gal service decisions are made by people who understand the client's busi-
ness, know the type of legal work that is required, and are able to help man-
agers think about the issues inherent in important business decisions. 
In the current environment, companies hire outside counsel for more 
than half the client's legal needs, but they tend to see it as company manag-
ers see any other make-or-buy decision the company faces. 94 A company 
might choose to make spare parts itself, for example, or buy them on an as-
needed basis from an outside firm. So it is with outside legal help. Law 
firms are familiar with the practice of hiring "contract lawyers," in other 
words, lawyers hired to do particular tasks when the firm is especially busy 
on a case or regulatory filing but whom the firm will not need in the long 
LOUIS U. L.J. 989, 1014 (2007). Robert Nelson was among the earliest to identify this trend. 
ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE 
LAW FIRM 56-62 (1988). 
91. NELSON, supra note 90, at 5. Nelson goes on: "The dominance of client interests 
in the practical activities of lawyers contradicts the view that large-firm lawyers serve a 
mediating function in the legal system." /d. at 232; see also Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth 
Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in 
Large Corporations, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 457, 477 (2000) (noting that in-house counsel 
may try to "market" their services to nonlawyers within the corporation by making their 
advice more palatable); E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, The Tensions, 
Stresses, and Professional Responsibilities of the Lawyer for the Corporation, 62 Bus. LAw. 
I, 2-25 (2006). See generally Sally R. Weaver, Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel: A 
Structural and Contextual Analysis, 46 EMORY L.J. l 023 (1997). 
92. Rosen, supra note 84, at 503-25. Two American Bar Foundation researchers 
describe three corporate counsel roles-cops, counsel, and entrepreneurs. Nelson & Nielsen, 
supra note 91, at 460; see also Carl D. Liggio, Sr., A Look at the Role of Corporate Counsel: 
Back to the Future-or Is It the Past?, 44ARIZ. L. REv. 621,625-28 (2002). 
93. See generally Rosen, supra note 84. 
94. Two excellent analyses of this process are LARRY SMITH, INSIDF10UTSIDE: How 
BUSINESSES BUY LEGAL SERVICES (200 l) and Steven L. Schwarcz, To Make or to Buy: In-
House Lawyering and Value Creation, 33 J. CORP. L. 497 (2008). 
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run.95 Today, private law firms can best be understood as inside counsel's 
version of contract lawyers. Sometimes they may be retained for commodity 
legal work that can be done inexpensively, such as by firms in India or 
elsewhere.96 Or, private firms might be retained when it is more cost-
effective to consult experienced outside counsel than to hire an expert inter-
nally.97 
In any event, most corporations view both inside and outside counsel 
as overhead costs rather than contributions to the bottom line. More and 
more, in-house counsel are cutting the number of outside firms a company 
retains, requiring highly-detailed case budgets, early assessments, regular 
updates, use of specific technology, and minimum experience levels for 
lawyers working on their cases (for example, no first-year associates).9R 
Inside counsel are more likely to receive rewards for reining in outside 
firms, not for coddling them.99 Successful outside firms will be those who 
project a sense that they understand the new rules and are prepared to be as 
entrepreneurial as the business people. 100 The ultimate challenge for outside 
lawyers, in tum, will be to demonstrate the value added that their services 
bring to a given client's situation. 101 
95. See, e.g., Janice Fioravante, Contract Lawyers in Hot Demand, CRAIN's NEW 
YORK (Jan. 8, 20 12), http://www .crainsnewyork.corn/article/20 120 I 08/SMALLBIZ/30 I 089 
988; Vanessa O'Connell, Lawyers Settle .. for Temp Jobs, WALL ST. J. (June 15, 2011), 
http:/ /online. wsj.corn/article/SB I 0001424052702303714 7045763836417 52966666.html. 
96. See, e.g., Laura Lewis Owens, With Legal Services, World Is Flat, NAT'L L.J., 
Jan. 15, 2007, at 15; Jennifer Fried, Looking Abroad for Low-Cost Lawyers, LEGAL TIMES, 
Jan. 19, 2004, at 21; Renee Deger, Following DuPont's Model, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 15, 2003, 
at 24. 
97. Sometimes the reasons for going outside are Jess clearly economic. Inside coun-
sel may want someone else to take the heat or assume liability for a risky decision, for exam-
ple, or to make a record that inside counsel sought "the best" advice so as to avoid criticism 
if the advice leads to an unsuccessful result. See, e.g., SPANGLER, supra note 84, at 104; 
Chayes & Chayes, supra note 90, at 294 (noting that outside counsel "tend more to be 'hired 
guns,' chosen for a particular job, and less and less members of an ongoing relationship with 
responsibility for the client's overall well-being"). 
98. ACC Survey: Managing Outside Counsel, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Dec. 
2008, at 25; Susan Hackett, Viva La Revolution?, CORP. COUNS., Apr. 2007, at 63; Thomas 
Sager, Not Going to Take It Anymore, CORP. COUNS., Sept. 2007, at 67; Debra Cassens 
Weiss, Wal-Mart Refuses Law Firm Fee Hikes, Cites High Associate Salaries, 
ABAJOURNAL.COM, Nov. 9, 2007, http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/wal_ 
mart_refuses_law_firm_fee_hikes_cites_high_associate_salaries/; see also SMITH, supra note 
94, at 151-69; SPANGLER, supra note 84, at 100. 
99. See ACC Survey: Managing Outside Counsel, supra note 98, at 25. 
100. Mark Stevens, Power of Attorney: The Rise of the Giant Law Firms 7-16 
(1987). 
101. See William C. Kelly, Jr., Reflections on Lawyer Morale and Public Service in 
an Age of Diminishing Expectations, in THE LAW FIRM AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 90, 90-103 
(Robert A Katzmann ed., 1995). 
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This kind of close review mirrors the frequent impersonality of mod-
em commercial dealings. Lawyers remember-<>r imagine they remem-
ber-the days when relationships with clients and within firms seemed like 
family ties. Not too long ago, at least some entrepreneurs were not well-
educated, and a lawyer-counselor was valued in part because he was more 
worldly. 102 The lawyer may even have been from a higher social class and 
able to introduce the business person to bankers and others that needed to 
get a business off the ground. 103 Today, business people are often extremely 
well educated and better connected in the wider world than are most law-
yers. Lawyers, thus, have become more valued for information than for their 
counsel. 
There is no escaping the reality that the practice of law has become 
more competitive and lawyers are more personally insecure. 104 In addition, 
corporations now use nonlawyers to help deliver a total package of services 
that they need done. 105 Negotiating contracts, troubleshooting discrimination 
claims, even writing court documents can all be done by nonlawyers within 
an organization receiving a level of lawyer supervision and training to 
which unauthorized practice rules cannot effectively speak. 106 Nonlawyers 
can help lower costs, but more importantly, they can help the client get its 
whole problem solved, not just the legal elements. Often, the nonlawyers 
will benefit from a degree of lawyer supervision, but particularly where a 
law firm opens an ancillary or law-related entity, the nonlawyers might be 
accountants or lobbyists, economists or nurses, statisticians or business spe-
cialists who are more than capable of acting on their own. Current legal 
ethics rules require a lawyer in a private law firm to supervise and take re-
sponsibility for the nonlawyer's work, 107 but that requirement is easily met, 
102. See SOL M. LINOWITZ WITH MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRA YEO PROFESSION: 
LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 12 (1994). 
103. !d. at 12-19,30-31. Linowitz tells the personal story of his relationship with the 
founder of Xerox and of other lawyers' relationships with founders oflarge companies./d. at 
60-65, 73-77. As was once not uncommon, Linowitz in effect served as inside counsel and 
hired himself as outside counsel. /d. at 83-90. He did not see the tension between his desire 
for independence as outside counsel and his recognition that corporate lawyers very much 
like him are the ones doing the evaluating and selecting of outside counsel. /d. 
104. MICHAEL H. TROTTER, PROFIT AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW: WHAT'S HAPPENED TO 
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 191-96 ( 1997). 
I 05. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Future Role of "Law Workers": Rethinking the 
Forms of Legal Practice and the Scope of Legal Education, 44 ARIZ. L. REv. 917, 918 
(2002). 
106. Professor Kritzer calls such persons "law workers" and sees them as examples of 
the kinds of people with whom lawyers are likely to compete in the future. See id; see gener-
ally HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS AND ORDINARY LITIGATION 
(1990); HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS AT WORK 
(1998); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Professions Are Dead, Long Live the Professions: Legal 
Practice in a Postprofessional World, 33 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 713 (1999). 
107. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCTR. 5.3 (2010). 
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and within an organizational client, lawyer supervision need only be provid-
ed if it is cost-effective to do so. 108 
CONCLUSION: REASONS FOR CONCERN BUT ALSO FOR HOPE 
The vision of the lawyer once held out to the world is largely vanish-
ing for reasons that do not primarily represent moral failing. We are no 
longer in charge of the legal system, if indeed we ever were. Lawyers must 
understand themselves in terms of the world in which they work and whose 
changing dynamics they cannot ignore. Our society will continue to have 
persons specially trained to deal with legal issues, but lawyers seem des-
tined primarily to provide a form of consulting services not limited to tradi-
tional legal advice and litigation. Like our forebears at the bar, we will have 
to develop the practical skills of muddling through. 
When lawyers controlled the legal system, in effect, society "paid" us 
to manage it effectively. As legal services become more like commodities, 
in tum, lawyers have less incentive to provide these public goods. I do not 
see the clock turning back on any of the changes we have discussed, but 
three kinds of issues raised by these developments will be especially signifi-
cant to the evolution of law and legal institutions as we move farther into 
the 21st century. 
First, other public institutions will be forced to help in efforts to pre-
serve the rule of law and legal institutions if they are to be preserved at all. 
If we posit that law is important and that delivering it on a more commer-
cial, and hopefully cheaper, basis is inevitable, public funding for our legal 
institutions will have to increase. As we know, however, today's public 
climate is about cutting spending of all kinds, not increasing spending even 
for essential public services. 
Our nation's state court systems, even in good times, have received no 
more than about 1% to 2% of state and federal budgets. 109 But the effect of 
having court budgets frozen, or now even decreased by 10% to 25%, have 
been devastating. 110 At least fourteen state court systems have been required 
108. See, e.g., Hackett, supra note 88, at 616 (showing that compliance programs in 
areas such as environmental, human resources, tax, marketing/antitrust, and health/safety are 
often under the direction of nonlawyer compliance officers who have access to lawyers but 
do not necessarily report to them). But see Richard S. Gruner, General Counsel in an Era of 
Compliance Programs and Corporate Self-Policing, 46 EMORY L.J. 1113, 1163-75 (1997) 
(arguing for assuming a more proactive role for corporate counsel in developing compliance 
programs). 
109. ABA TASK FORCE ON PRESERVATION OF THE JUSTICE SYS., CRISIS IN THE COURTS: 
DEFINING THE PROBLEM 3 (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content 
/dam/aba/images/public _ education/pub-ed-lawday _ abaresolution _ crisiscourtsdec20 ll.pdf. 
II 0. !d. at 4. 
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to close one or more days each week.''' At least one Georgia circuit is now 
unable to hear any civil case. 112 Time required to resolve cases in Los Ange-
les will go from less than two years in 2009 to more than four and a quarter 
years in 2012. 113 
The problems of our judicial system are not going to be automatically 
self-correcting, and while lawyer organizations have been at the forefront of 
calls for more public support, they have tended not to call for lawyer pro 
bono mediation or acting judge programs in which lawyers would volunteer 
to absorb part of the cost themselves. 114 A functioning system of justice re-
mains in lawyers' interest as well as the interest of our clients, but we now 
expect others to pay for it and it remains to be seen whether they will. 
Second, we have traditionally thought of law as publicly produced-
by legislatures or the courts-but there seems to be an increasing reality of 
the private production of law. Private contracts have long created a form of 
law, for example, that let parties define their respective rights. Add an arbi-
tration clause to the mix and perhaps courts will become less significant. 115 
Case law today has become privatized by law publishers, with Lexis 
and Westlaw being the only source of many "unpublished" opinions. 116 Le-
gal principles are restated by the American Law Institute and treated by the 
courts as reliable and almost authoritative. 117 Model laws are created by the 
Ill. Id. at 5 (citing NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, BUDGET IMPACTS (2010)). 
112. Id. (citing testimony from Georgia Supreme Court Chief Justice Carol Hun-
stein). Citizens in that circuit cannot get a divorce, address child custody matters, or try any 
business or personal injury cases. I d. 
113. Id. at 7 (citing ROY WEINSTEIN & STEVAN PORTER, ECONOMIC IMPACT ON THE 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES AND THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA OF FUNDING CUTBACKS AFFECTING 
THE LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT 8 (2009)); see also N.Y. CNTY. LAWERS' ASS'N TASK 
FORCE ON JUDICIAL BUDGET CUTS, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE EFFECT OF JUDICIAL BUDGET 
CUTS ON NEW YORK STATE COURTS (2011), available at http://www.nylj.com/nylawyer/ 
adgifs/decisions/081711 nycla.pdf. 
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ABA's top priorities for 2011-12. Olson, Boies Call for Court Aid, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS 
& INSIGHT (Aug. 7, 2011), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2011/08_-
_August/Oison,_Boies_call_for_court_aid/. Its success, however, does not seem inevitable. 
See, e.g., James Podgers, In Defense of the Courts: A Symposium Finds Consensus on the 
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Production (Univ. of Ill. Coil. of Law, Behavior & Soc. Sci. Research Papers Series, Paper 
No. LBSSII-27, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfrn?abstract_id=l88 
4985. 
116. See LEXISNEXIS, http://www.lexisnexis.com (last visited May 25, 2012); 
WESTLAW, http://www.westlaw.com (last visited May 25, 2012). 
117. See Kristin David Adams, Blaming the Mirror: The Restatements and the Com-
mon Law, 40 IND. L. REV. 205 (2007); Michael Traynor, The First Restatements and the 
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National Commission on Unifonn State Laws, and the ABA copyrights its 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and sells them to state courts and 
lawyers. 118 
Such developments can be jarring to those who see law as free and 
freely available, but I would suggest that this legal privatization may not be 
altogether bad. Although it may initially seem counterintuitive, the ability to 
create law as a product may well make it more available to middle-class 
consumers. One example is LegalZoom, the increasingly popular source of 
documents that allow individual citizens to create wills, trusts, corporations, 
and the like. 119 Such documents formerly were available only from lawyers 
at far higher prices, and there is a danger that turning clients into form-
buyers will render legal services impersonal and make the lawyer-client 
relationship more shallow. If we look at the alternatives, however, it may be 
that a shallow, less-expensive relationship will be better than no relationship 
at all. 
Third, my own view is that we are likely to find an institutional deliv-
ery of legal services replace the delivery of services by individual lawyers. 
Today, many of us receive medical care from clinics composed of several 
doctors, any of whom we might see on any given visit. That is less personal 
than the old days of having a single family doctor, but the system tends to 
allow the doctors more regular hours and the patients a range of doctors to 
meet specialized problems. That kind of model already describes the legal 
service many private firms offer corporate clients. It is also the kind of legal 
service provided by liability insurance companies and at many legal aid 
offices. I expect the pressures and possibilities of technology will make 
service to individual private clients soon delivered on the same basis. 
Professor Ted Schneyer urged twenty years ago that discipline be im-
posed on law firms, not exclusively individuallawyers. 120 He was right, and 
if I am right, our focus should be on creating a regulatory regime that gives 
law firms a stake in producing quality work and building their reputations. 
Providing multi-disciplinary services from a single firm, 121 allowing non-
118. See About the ULC, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION: NAT'L COMMISSION ON UNIFORM 
STATE LAWS, http://uniform1aws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=About%20the%20ULC (last visit-
ed May 25, 20 12). 
119. For further information, see LEGALZOOM, http://www.lega1zoom.com (last visit-
ed May 25, 20 12). 
120. See generally Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 
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of Law Firm Management, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 577 (20 11 ). 
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5.4(a) (2010). Rule 5.7 directly addresses a law finn's delivery of what the rule calls "law-
related services." !d. at R. 5.7. 
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compete agreements to reduce lawyer mobility,122 and permitting nonlawyer 
investment in law firms would likely be part of the picture. 123 That is the 
direction Great Britain and Australia have taken, 124 and although U.S. law-
yers have resisted these changes, I believe the resistance is ultimately likely 
to break down. 
It is tempting to wish we could return to the past that never was. As I 
believe the other articles in this symposium suggest, our challenge is rather 
to prepare for a future that is inevitable, to take steps that are possible, and 
to help build a system that-while possibly different-will be one in which 
lawyers can continue to take pride. 
122. This would require changes in the traditional understanding of the Model Rules' 
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5.4(d). 
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TIMES (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.ft.com/intl,cms/s/0/2bal47c4-4b58-llel-88a3-
00144feabdcO.html; Anthony Notaras, Law Firms: To List or Not to List?, INT'L B. Ass'N., 
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